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As is the case for many of our entitlements, our rights of action are
protected by a less-than-full property rule. As a result, financing of litiga-
tion has been limited. The recent rise of alternate dispute financing has
raised serious ethical problems. In this Article, I discuss those problems,
dismiss some (but not all) of them, and suggest that pushing the protection
of our entitlement to sue closer to a property rule might alleviate those
problems that remain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every legal jurisdiction has some "inalienability rules"' scattered
among its many property rule protections of entitlements. For example, I
cannot sell myself into slavery. Relatedly, I can "lease" you my arm (i.e., I
can chop wood for you for pay for a certain time), but I cannot sell it to
you. I can neither sell nor buy my entitlement to vote, though I may legally
"give it away" by declining to exercise it (unless I live in Australia,
Belgium, Brazil or one of nineteen other countries).2 I may give my blood
(thus my entitlement to my blood is protected by a partial inalienability
rule), but in many states I may not sell it.' More momentously, I can create
a baby, may give away custody rights (by delivering the baby for adoption,
for example) and may ask to be given custody rights (by adopting), but I
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. Many thanks to Wesley Weeks for his always
excellent research assistance. The title is a takeoff on Free the Grapes@: www.freethegrapes.org, an
organization dedicated to the abolition of archaic wine distribution laws. This Article queries whether
the anti-maintenance rule (ABA Rule 1.8(e)) is equally archaic.
1. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Michael I. Krauss, Property Rules vs.
Liability Rules, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMics 782, 786-87 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Ger-
rit De Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/3800book.pdf.
2. Compulsory Voting, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCompulsory-voting#By-
countnes (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (Countries that enforce their compulsory voting laws include Ar-
gentina, Australia, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Luxembourg, Peru, Singapore, Uruguay,
and one canton in Switzerland. Countries that have compulsory voting laws but do not regularly en-
force them include Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, Leb-
anon, Libya, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Thailand.).
3. For a list of state laws on organ sales, including exceptions for the sale of blood, see U.S.
Dept. of State, Sale of Organs and Related Statutes, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
135994.pdf.
247
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
may not buy custody rights.4 As can be imagined, moral principles typi-
cally explain why full or partial inalienability rules are chosen to protect
certain entitlements.5
It turns out that our litigation rights are protected by a modified ina-
lienability rule. I can give away my right to sue you-indeed a (weakening)
social norm discourages my taking you to court.6 Alternatively, I can use
my right by suing you. And I can "sell" my right to you, by settling on
mutually agreeable terms. But this is only partial inalienability, because I
cannot sell my right to sue you to anyone else, except that I may exchange
part of my claim to a lawyer in return for his obligation to represent me in
my suit.' Nor can I buy anyone else's claim, unless of course I am an attor-
ney and then only in exchange for my legal services as stated immediately
above. So, to be sure, the law protects my litigation rights with a partial
inalienability rule.
A highly interesting question is whether that partial inalienability rule
should be eliminated and replaced by a pure property rule. One can imag-
ine a world where people and firms can buy the right to sue in tort, for
instance, even before a cause of action arises' or, less radically, after an
accident happens.9 Should third parties be allowed to set up markets in
tort suits, the rights to which could then be carved up and marketed in
diversified tranches, as is done with mortgage-backed securities?'o To the
contrary, is the status quo of partial inalienability, with certain very restric-
tive exceptions for attorneys only, optimal? Or finally, should we proceed
with caution and move ever so slightly more towards a property rule, while
keeping crucial inalienability limitations?
4. For an article advocating a more market-based approach to this issue, see Elisabeth Landes
& Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). For a critique of
this argument, see Tamar Frankel & Francis H. Miller, Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions,
67 B.U. L. REV. 99 (1987).
5. See Krauss, supra note 1, at 789-90.
6. See Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
1697 (2005). Some have claimed that we shirk our moral duty to litigate, given the public good that
precedent provides. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 443,
467 (1987) ("To assert a legal claim is to perform a vital civic obligation."). For criticisms of this propo-
sal, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1810 (1995); Charles J. Goetz, Commentary on 'To-
wards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims': Collateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REv. 413 (1989); Alan
Schwartz, Commentary on 'Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims': A Long Way Yet To Go, 75
VA. L. REV. 423 (1989).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.4(c) (2004).
8. The most radical proposals would allow plaintiffs to sell unmatured tort claims for wrongs
that have not yet occurred. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75
VA. L. REV. 383 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697
(2005); Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30
Am. Bus. L.J. 485 (1992); Marc Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD.
329 (1987).
10. See, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES MARKETS (1992).
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In this paper, I begin by briefly sketching the two-dimensional view of
litigation learned by 1L Law students. The real world is not two-dimen-
sional, of course, and the dimension of time creates risks for plaintiffs (and,
to a lesser extent, for defendants) that are not incorporated into the 1L
model. Legal institutions classically evolved to enable both defendants and
plaintiffs to cope with those risks, but many claim that the classical setup
unduly disfavors plaintiffs."
II. THE 1L PARADIGM OF "INSTANTANEOUS TORT" AND ITS FLAWS
In my 1L Torts class we begin the semester by examining the famous
Wisconsin case, Vosburg v. Putney.12 The case is indecipherable enough
for my rookie students, what with its (to say the least) unintuitive approach
to intentional torts and its opaque (to them) distinction between contract
and tort damages. Students' heads are often spinning after our Socratic
encounter with the two young Waukesha boys whose seemingly casual in-
teraction led to such tragedy.
And yet 1L students typically don't see the full tragedy of Vosburg. To
my students, one young boy sues another after the first is injured. Each
hires, and presumably pays for (though the students don't consider that), a
lawyer. Litigation is instantaneous and cost-free. A decision is rendered
and immediately appealed. A final decision is rendered, and the liable
party repairs the tort. Corrective justice is satisfied," the Rule of Law is
elucidated and advanced, and that is the end of the story. The defendant
pays the plaintiff if liable; the defendant pays nothing if not liable.
Alas, losses incurred in the typical tort suit are not instantaneous
"one-off" losses as a two-dimensional 1L examination might imply. Steal
my empty briefcase and you've caused an instantaneous, one-off loss that
has no real effect on my ability to meet any ongoing obligations. Break my
leg and you've possibly caused me a lifetime of lost income and decreased
potential that I desperately need to get back before the bills become due.
1L can be so overwhelming that it may take time for students to real-
ize how much they missed when they first looked at Vosburg:14
* The case took years to resolve. Twice the trial court's
judgment on the verdict was appealed; four times the
11. I am indebted to the American Bar Association's Commission on Ethics 20/20, which re-
ported on Alternate Litigation Financing to the ABA House of Delegates in February 2012. The Com-
mission report may be found at http://www.americanbar.org/contentL/dam/abaladministrative/ethics_20
20/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf white paperfinalhod informational report.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Aug. 23,2013). The Report remained agnostic on many of the issues with which I will be dealing
in this paper, but provided excellent food for thought.
12. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
13. Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 623, 634-36 (1991);
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA Of PRIVATE LAw 196-203 (1995).
14. Here I only deal with the financial and related risks that students tend to miss. See Zigurds
Zile, Vosburg v. Putney A Centennial Story. 1992 Wis. L. REV. 877 (1992) for a rich factual history of
the case, of the kind that is always left out of sterile casebook summaries.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with the case in one
form or another.'5
* Andrew Vosburg's medical bills were staggering, and ap-
proached 100% of his parents' annual income, this in a
day when there was no health insurance.16 The exac-
tions on his family, preceding the final settlement, must
have been tremendous.
* The direct court costs of litigating were enormous, with
plaintiffs' costs approaching 200% of the Vosburgs' an-
nual income and defendants' costs approaching 50% of
the average Waukesha worker's annual income."
* The Vosburgs' attorneys' normal charges-not payable
by the Putneys regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
case because of the "American Rule "'8 -were appar-
ently more than one year's family income.' 9
* After many years and two plaintiff's verdicts, the ulti-
mate payment of $1200 may have left both parties and
plaintiff's attorneys in the red.20
III. COMMON LAW ADAPTATIONS TO THE
"INSTANTANEOUs TORT" PARADIGM
The Common Law reflects the long-term risks of torts that the 1L stu-
dent so easily misses, through the development of institutions that allow
the parties to purchase "options "21 on these risks.
A. On the Defendant's Side
Institutions have sprung up to shoulder much of the ongoing risk of
complex litigation. The most frequent tool employed by defendants is lia-
bility insurance. While first-party insurance (wherein the purchaser pays
someone to assume risks of damage to the purchaser's own property) ar-
guably dates from almost two thousand years before the Common Era,2 2
15. Id. at 971.
16. Id. at 892.
17. Id. at 973. The Putneys were a relatively wealthy family; the Vosburgs were not.
18. See John Leubsdorf, Toward A History ofthe American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L.
& CoNr. PROB. 9 (Winter 1984).
19. Zile, supra note 14, at 974.
20. Id. at 977. Wisconsin had just recently authorized contingent fees, and it is not clear whether
plaintiffs' lawyers had selected such an arrangement.
21. Option contracts give one the right to elect to buy (or sometimes sell) the underlying asset or
security at a set price if exercised by a set expiration date. JAMES BRADFIELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 377-79 (2007). Options markets, such as futures markets, allow
risks to be spread and communicate information to the market resulting in greater efficiency. See id. at
415-430.
22. The Babylonians developed a first party insurance system which was recorded in the Code of
Hammurabi, c. 1750 B.C., and practiced by early Mediterranean sailing merchants. If a merchant re-
ceived a loan to fund his shipment, he would pay the lender an additional sum in exchange for the
lender's guarantee to cancel the loan should the shipment be stolen.
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third-party or liability insurance (wherein the purchaser pays someone to
assume risks of damage to the property of others, for which the purchaser
would otherwise be liable) is of more recent vintage. Until the early 20th
Century, almost all liability policies covered Workers' Compensation liabil-
ity and nothing else. But starting in the 1920's (prompted no doubt by the
advent and massive spread of the automobile, a machine allowing an impe-
cunious person to cause considerable damage in a short time), general lia-
bility insurance (with caps of $5000, typically) began to be marketed.2 3
Today, liability insurance is highly developed and generally provides
dual protection to insureds: it covers both any eventual liability resulting
from judgment or settlement as well as legal fees to defend against any
liability claim, founded or not.2 4 Of course this creates a moral hazard, as
negligence is more likely if its cost is borne by a third party. Liability insur-
ance limits this moral hazard through co-pays (self-insurance by the liable
party), liability limits, and underwriting evaluation (setting a premium
based on correlates to moral hazard such as credit history).2 5
Attorneys have devised other protections against the ongoing risks of
tort litigation. Uninsured tort defendants typically pay their attorneys by
the hour, as the Vosburg case illustrated, total hourly rates are as unpre-
dictable as tort cases are long and complex. Though rare, reverse contin-
gent fees are one way to protect against this risk. Under a reverse
contingent fee, the parties agree on an objective worst-case liability scena-
rio (the amount may well be much less than the exaggerated amount
claimed by the plaintiff). 26 The parties agree that the attorney is entitled to
23. James A. Robinson, How Umbrella Policies Started Part 1: Early Liability Coverage, Risk &
Insurance, IMRI (Mar. 2000), http://www.irmi.com/expertlarticles/2000/robertson03.aspx.
24. This second aspect of liability insurance is necessitated by the "American Rule," which pro-
vides that lawyers' fees are not considered to be proximately caused by wrongdoing. Thus, each party
bears his fees, regardless of the outcome of any litigation, unless the tort of malicious prosecution can
be proved. Leubsdorf, supra note 18, at 9; Biggans v. Hajoca Corp., 94 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa.
1950) affd, 185 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1950) (footnotes omitted) ("There are a number of circumstances and
conditions for the existence of which the jury may award compensatory damages to a plaintiff in an
action for malicious prosecution. Some of these, a number of which overlap, may be listed as follows:
Loss of liberty, loss of time, physical suffering or discomfort, mental suffering from humiliation and
injury to feelings, injury to reputation and station in the community in which he resides, or does busi-
ness, the risk of conviction, and the reasonable and necessary expenses in securing his release from
arrest and defending the criminal prosecution."). Even a non-negligent defendant can therefore be
called on to pay many tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees to defend himself against unfounded
lawsuits - so liability insurance has stepped in to protect against this risk. In other countries, these risks
are borne only by wrongdoers and false claimants.
25. Many state politicians have introduced efforts to prevent liability insurance companies from
using credit history to set premiums. See Heather Morton, Use of Credit Information in Insurance 2011
Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/
issues-researchlbanking/use-of-credit-information-in-insurance-2011-legisl.aspx. For example, Mary-
land legislators in 2011 declined to adopt a bill which would have banned the use of credit history to set
motor vehicle insurance premiums. H.B. 1083, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011), available at http://
mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmgalfrmMain.aspx?tab=subject3&ys=2011rs/billfile/hbl083.htm. For an in-
depth look at the correlation between liability and credit scores, see Patrick Butler, Why Low Credit
Scores Predict More Auto Liability Claims: Two Theories, Working Paper (July 3, 2007), http://
www.centspermilenow.org/774-7703.pdf.
26. In Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, the plaintiff sued for $17,500 and the jury awarded
$1,750. 291 N.W. 2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1980). Under the terms of the reverse contingent fee agreement,
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a percentage of any amounts ultimately saved from this sum. If the worst-
case scenario unfolds, the defense attorney earns no fee.27 Alternatively,
firms such as Clearspire 28 have based their business model on defendant
fixed-fee billing, wherein the law firm shares with the client the risk of un-
duly complex and costly representation.2 9
B. On the Plaintiffs Side
There also exist legal institutions designed to ease the risk of complex
tort damage for victims. Most obvious is first party insurance. However,
this insurance is very incomplete. Roughly half of all tort damages are
"general" or non-pecuniary damages, called "pain and suffering" in many
jurisdictions.30 Plaintiffs typically cannot purchase pain-and-suffering in-
surance for several reasons." Other institutions include:
1. The Collateral Source Rule32
If Dave Defendant negligently sets fire to Peter Plaintiff's barn, de-
stroying the barn and livestock and making it impossible for Peter to earn a
living, Peter's neighbors might spontaneously organize a barn-raising bee
to replace the barn and livestock immediately, thereby eliminating the risk
of interminable litigation and tempting low-ball offers from Dave. Peter's
neighbors, who pooled the risk, might decide to obtain subrogation from
Peter if and when Dave is called upon to compensate. In any case Peter's
suit against David can go forward, without the intense time pressures typi-
cally felt by plaintiffs in a tort suit. The payment by Peter's neighbors does
not extinguish David's debt, whether or not the neighbors have subrogated,
pursuant to the collateral source rule. Of course most subrogated parties
are first-party insurers as per the preceding paragraph, but the general
the lawyer representing the defendant would have been entitled to $5,250, or one-third of the $15,750
"saved" the client. Id. Relying in part on and quoting at length from an amicus brief filed by the
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association, the Iowa Supreme
Court found the fee agreement to be unreasonable (today under Model Rule 1.5) and void as against
public policy, stating that the amount demanded in a tort claim was too speculative an amount upon
which to base a reverse contingent fee. Id. at 336.
27. Reverse contingent fees were approved by the American Bar Association Standing Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Formal Opinion 93-373 (1993) (Contingent Fees in
Civil Cases Based on the Amount of Money Saved for the Client).
28. See www.clearspire.com.
29. See, e.g., Alternative Law Firms, THE ECoNOMIsT, Aug. 13. 2011, for a description of the
Clearspire model. This author was of counsel to Clearspire during its formative period, 2010-2012.
30. See Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 296 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product
Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 Iwr'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
31. Moral hazard precludes the development of a pain-and-suffering insurance market in most
cases-it is too easy to "fake" a claim not verifiable by a first-party insurer. In those rare instances
where moral hazard has not precluded it, pain-and-suffering insurance is indeed demanded by prospec-
tive tort victims. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law. 108 HARV. L. REV 1785 (June 1995).
32. See generally Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort's Soul, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1 (Fall 2009).
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availability of the collateral source rule goes beyond first party insurance."
If there is subrogation, the ensuing moral hazard 34 is minimized by a con-
tractual clause whereby the insured party agrees to provide all necessary
assistance to the insurance company in pursuing any subrogated claims.
2. Contingent Fees
A contingent fee is essentially a non-recourse "advance" of the cost of
litigation by the plaintiff's attorney, in return for a share of the proceeds if
there is settlement or judgment. The "advance" is not (except for official
court costs, which must be reimbursed to the lawyer by all but indigent
clients) a loan, because of the non-recourse nature of the arrangement.
Contingent fees were once banned in the United States as illegal cham-
perty," but lawyers became exempt from champerty as the contingent fee
became accepted." Contingent fees allow an impoverished plaintiff (per-
haps impoverished by the tort itself) to secure legal services that, because
of the American rule that prohibits fee shifting to losing defendants, she
could likely not purchase by the hour. The lawyer thus shares part (the
part represented by the value of her legal services) of the risk of tort litiga-
tion. Lawyers have a monopsonic right to purchase shares in cases in this
way, leading to monopoly "rents" and to calls by some to outlaw contin-
gent fees.38 And of course only some litigation costs are borne by the con-
tingent-fee attorney-housing costs and medical costs must still be paid by
the injured plaintiff during litigation.3 9
Though markets and private law have provided both parties to a tort
suit with means to mitigate the risks of long-term litigation, a crucial ques-
tion is whether one party gets more protection than the other. The claim
that the impecunious (perhaps because of the tort inflicted on him) plaintiff
33. Id. at 33-50.
34. A plaintiff who has already been compensated may less ardently pursue the party that is
liable to him.
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2004) ("A lawyer shall not provide finan-
cial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a law-
yer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on
the outcome of the matter.").
36. Champerty is the furtherance of litigation: "We must regard an agreement by any attorney to
undertake the conduct of a litigation on his own account, to pay the costs and expenses thereof, and to
receive as his compensation a portion of the proceeds of the recovery, or of the thing in dispute, as
obnoxious to the law against champerty." Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 632 (1897) (citing the District
Court at 6 Ap. D.C. 283, 284).
37. Even British courts impliedly recognize this: "Champerty is an aggravated form of mainte-
nance. The distinguishing feature of champerty is the support of litigation BY A STRANGER in return for
a share of the proceeds." Giles v. Thompson, [1993] 3 All ER 321 at 329 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/2.html. Subrogated parties, and attorneys, are not strangers
to the lawsuit.
38. See, e.g., R. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for
Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (1995).
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.8(e) (2004), which prohibits the lawyer from
advancing such costs, even with recourse (as a loan).
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does not currently receive the equivalent of what liability insurance pro-
vides to defendant relies on the argument that plaintiffs cannot spread cer-
tain important risks in advance. Kindly neighbors may rescue a tort victim
who ultimately avails himself of the collateral source rule, to be sure. But
the only guaranteed protectiton a prospective victim can purchase in ad-
vance is insurance, and that insurance does not cover non-pecuniary costs.
Similarly, after the accrual of a right of action (that is, after the accident),
the lawyer can advance court costs, expert witness fees and the costs of the
lawyer's own time and disbursements, but may not advance the myriad
costs of living that may so pressure the plaintiff that he may be tempted to
accept a low-ball offer from a clearly culpable defendant. Plaintiff's lawyer
would arguably be an efficient provider of such costs of living (he has an
informational advantage over banks or other lending institutions in deter-
mining the likelihood of victory, as he is privy to confidential client infor-
mation and also has expert access to the legal rules that affect the outcome
of the case) if such provision were allowed. But it is not. Despite the fact
that lawyers are bound by ethics rules not to launch frivolous suits,4 0 their
full financing would constitute barratry, a serious felony in some states,
everywhere prohibited on the grounds that lawyers able to fully finance
lawsuits would "chase ambulances," stir up litigation, damage social cohe-
sion and inflame enmities.41
Because of this alleged asymmetry in institutional risk management, it
is claimed 42 that prospective tort victims should be allowed to sell a secur-
ity (an investment in the right of action that has accrued in their favor) just
as defendants purchase a security (the assumption by others of future tort
liability debts) through liability insurance. Both types of securities allow
risk-averse parties to purchase protection from the risks of uncertain, ex-
pensive and long-winded litigation-the defendant by paying a premium to
share his load and the plaintiff by receiving a premium in return for sharing
his booty.
The fact is that the plaintiff in a tort suit has suffered a possibly disa-
bling loss right away, while the defendant is only out of pocket after a set-
tlement or final judgment. Thus, if tort litigation lasts a long time, plaintiffs
who can neither obtain bank financing nor sell a security as described will
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.1 (2004).
41. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12 (West 2009). Barratry And Solicitation Of Profes-
sional Employment:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit the person: ....
(3) pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or advance to a prospective client money or
anything of value to obtain employment as a professional from the prospective client: ....
(c) It is an exception to prosecution under Subsection (a) or (b) that the person's conduct is
authorized by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or any rule of court. ...
(f) An offense under Subsection (a) or (b) is a felony of the third degree. ...
(i) Final conviction of felony barratry is a serious crime for all purposes and acts, specifically
including the State Bar Rules and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
42. See, e.g., J. Burton LeBlanc & S. Ann Saucer, All About Alternative Litigation Financing,
49(1) TRIAL (Jan. 2013).
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be vulnerable to low-ball offers from defendants, who might therefore sys-
tematically pay less than the damage they have wrongfully caused.
Whether one sees Tort law as grounded in corrective justice4 3 (which re-
quires that the wrongdoer fully compensate the victim for the wrong that
has been proximately caused) or deterrence" (which requires that the
"price" seen by defendants be high enough to deter their future misfea-
sance), systematic underpayment fails to achieve Tort law's purposes.
If full securitization of lawsuits were allowed, this would pose ethical
problems for attorneys of securitized suits. It's worthwhile to enumerate
some of these problems right away-other issues will be dealt with in detail
below:
1. Who controls the litigation? Lawyers must consult with
clients on the means of pursuing litigation, and must defer
to clients on its ends (responses to settlement offers, etc.).4 5
When the client and those who have purchased securities in
her litigation disagree on such issues, whose judgment
should prevail? Should the prospectus, relied on by inves-
tors, be allowed to become the "constitution" of the case,
prevailing over the lawyer's own ethical duties?
2. To whom is owed the lawyer's duties of confidentiality
and loyalty? Should the lawyer be allowed to breach confi-
dentiality to investors if the client reveals information detri-
mental to their investment or perhaps contrary to the
prospectus that preceded it? Or should the lawyer's ethical
duties46 yield to the prospectus?
3. What if some investors sue others, or the client?4 7 Can
the lawyer remain in the case or must he withdraw from all
representation, possibly to the extreme detriment of his
client?
Questions such as these make it clear that full securitization of law-
suits, wherein causes of action would be transformed into "widgets" (fungi-
ble things, like barrels of oil or the output of factories) protected by pure
property rules, might arguably entail a sea-change" in the notion of lawy-
ering. It is far from clear that anyone advocates such a transformation. A
43. KRAUSS & WEINRIB, supra note 13.
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM MARTIN LANDES & RICHARD ALLEN POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAw (1987).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 (2004).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004).
48. Full fathom five thy father lies,
Of his bones are coral made,
Those are pearls that were his eyes,
Nothing of him that doth fade,
But doth suffer a sea-change,
into something rich and strange,
Sea-nymphs hourly ring his knell,
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tort suit seems very different from a human heart (which is covered by an
inalienability rule) but a tort suit is not a widget either. A tort suit has
some characteristics intrinsically personal to the client, which arguably rule
out pure property rule protection.
In the context of this reflection, it is interesting to note that quasi-
securitization has reared its head in the form of Alternate Litigation Fi-
nancing (ALF), a new plaintiff's option that may rectify the asymmetry in
risk sharing between plaintiffs and defendants, all the while respecting the
personal nature of a lawsuit.
IV. THE RISE OF A NEW PLAINTIFF'S OPTION: ALTERNATE LITIGATION
FINANCING (ALF)
A. Basic Features of ALF Currently
ALF involves only matured tort claims. Selling of non-matured tort
claims (wherein a future plaintiff assigns any tort claim she might have in
the future to the purchaser, likely an insurance company, in return for the
purchaser paying the future plaintiff a certain sum, either in one lump sum
or more likely in periodic payments)4 9 is to liability insurance what a re-
verse mortgage is to a mortgage. Essentially the annuity payments to the
sellers of non-matured claims amounts to ex ante compensation for recov-
ery, but of course there is no tort compensation at all, for there has been no
tort. Sales of non-mature tort claims eviscerate tort's corrective justice
raison d'itre, and perhaps for that reason no serious proposal to permit
them has ever been made."o
In current ALF, only part of the claim is sold, in return for money
given to plaintiff to pay for litigation and/or living expenses and to replace
lost income until receipt of funds. The plaintiff remains in control of the
litigation and remains the only client from the attorney's perspective. Pre-
sumably, the partial transfer of the tort claim mitigates moral hazard (re-
duction in the incentive the plaintiff has to vigorously prosecute her own
case caused by its sale).
In addition, current ALF financing is non-recourse; that is, if the plain-
tiff never obtains recovery, nothing need be paid to the ALF provider.s"
Because there is no absolute debt on the part of the plaintiff, the "advance"
is considered not a "loan," but an "investment," and is therefore (just like
Ding-dong.
Hark! now I hear them, ding-dong, bell.
Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act 1, Scene 2.
49. For a promotion of this full property rule transformation by an economist, see Cooter, supra
note 8. See also Stephen Marks, The Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Twenty Years Later, Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 11-14 (2011), http://www.bu.edullaw/faculty/scholarship/work-
ingpapers/2011.html. Insurance companies would have comparative advantages in purchasing non-ma-
tured tort claims-they are in a good position to evaluate risks, and by selling liability insurance they
are in a position to cancel out (through a clearing house mechanism with other insurers) purchased
claims and thereby reduce transaction costs.
50. Criticisms of Cooter's proposal include Goetz, supra note 6 and Schwartz, supra note 6.
51. This is only the case for individual financing-see the list of various kinds of financing below.
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contingent fees) not subject to state usury rules. ALF firms typically at-
tempt to maximize the likelihood that they will not be considered lenders
by terming the plaintiff a "transferor" of part of his interest in his litigation,
not a "borrower." The funding company, for its part, is termed a "trans-
feree," not a "lender." Obviously, if tort recovery were virtually certain ex
ante, this contract language might not prevail and the transaction might
well be termed a loan.52
Finally, ALF is currently offered by finance companies, not by lawyers,
who are forbidden to enter this market under Model Rule 1.8(e). Thus, the
Model Rule requirement that all charges be objectively reasonable13 does
not apply to ALF.
Just as defendants who purchase liability insurance are protected (up
to the coverage limits purchased) from the risks of an anti-defendant out-
come, so are plaintiffs who are ALF transferors protected from the risks of
an anti-plaintiff outcome to the extent of the payments "purchased" by
transferring litigation rights. Of course, a liability insurance policy does not
give the insurer an interest in any litigation, for such policies are written
before any tort is mature. There IS NO case at the moment when liability
insurance is subscribed, and in fact some of the value that liability insurers
add consists of their help in preventing cases from arising in the first place
(malpractice insurers encouraging competent professional practice; boiler
insurers are experts in boilers and inspect for non-negligent maintenance;
etc.). 54
B. Possible Complaints About ALF?
1. Is ALF-to-Plaintiffs Champerty or Maintenance?
As will be seen in greater detail below, ALF provides funding to indi-
vidual clients in some cases, to corporate clients in others, and to law firms
in yet other cases, in exchange for a lucrative amount of any eventual re-
covery. But corporations, clients, and lawyers have always been able to
borrow money after legal proceedings have begun." When one borrows
money, collateral is often pledged; here the collateral is aleatory (the even-
tual recovery). Is ALF, so described, champerty?
52. See, e.g., Lawsuit Fin. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). However, In 2010,
two ALF providers sued the Colorado Attorney General to obtain a declaratory judgment that their
activities are not loans and are therefore by definition not subject to state usury rules. The trial judge
hearing this suit held that under Colorado's Uniform Consumer Credit Code, debt need not be re-
course and therefore consumer ALF transactions made with an "expectation of repayment" may not
charge more than the interest rate set by that state's usury law. See generally Sheri P. Adler, Alternative
Litigation Finance and the Usury Challenge: A Multi-Factor Approach, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 329 (2012).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.5 (2004).
54. Harris Schlesinger and Emilio Venezian, Insurance Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity:
Profits, Market Structure, and Consumer Welfare, 17 RAND J. EcON. 227 (1986).
55. If a third party offers money to sustain someone who has not had the idea to sue someone
else, that would be "maintenance," which was illegal under common law. Black's Law Dictionary
defines maintenance as "[a]n officious intermeddling in a lawsuit by a non party by maintaining, sup-
porting or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation."
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Champerty is a form of maintenance, and is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as "[a] bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by
which the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving
part of any judgment proceeds."
In my opinion, ALF is clearly not champerty, because the "stranger"
(the ALF finance company) doesn't pursue the party's claim or direct the
litigation, contemplation of which took place before the intervention of the
ALF firm. [Nor, by the way, is subrogation champerty, for the same
reason.]
2. Is ALF Substantively Unfair?
As will be seen below, plaintiffs who obtain ALF often pay 60-80%
interest. Law firms who obtain ALF to finance ongoing litigation typically
pay over 20% interest. These rates might seem, respectively, so steep as to
be unconscionable. Should the law tolerate such high interest rates if the
alternative is that viable litigation will not be launched, or will be squelched
by a low settlement that makes the high interest rate appear attractive by
comparison?
3. Is ALF-to-Law-Firms Fee-Sharing?
Law firms have always been able to borrow money to smooth out their
cash flow between cases, to finance salaries and to pay for other expendi-
tures in long-running contingent fee cases where no income will be re-
ceived for a long period. But under Model Rule 5.4(a), law firms cannot
share fees with non-lawyers.56 ALF seems to come suspiciously close to fee
sharing if lawyers may not pledge their accounts receivable to receive fi-
nancing. At least one court has rejected the claim that fee sharing is in-
volved in ALF.
4. Is ALF-to-Corporations Illicit Gambling?
Companies issue prospecti and solicit funds on the basis of individual
opportunities all the time. A corporation exploring for oil can secure fund-
ing on the risky possibility of the find being a "gusher." Analogously, ALF
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 5.4(A) (2004). But see DC RULE 5.4(B) ("A lawyer
may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial interest is held or
managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which
assist the organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if: (1) The partnership or organiza-
tion has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients; (2) All persons having such managerial
authority or holding a financial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct; (3)
The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or organization
undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer partici-
pants were lawyers under Rule 5.1; (4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.").
57. In Core Funding Group v. McDonald, it was held that it is not inappropriate for a lender to
take a security interest in an attorney's accounts receivable, to the extent permitted by commercial law.
No. L-05-1291, 2006 WL 832833 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006). This is an ordinary secured transaction
and does not violate the prohibition on sharing fees with a nonlawyer, the court concluded. Following
these principles, no prohibited fee splitting would be involved if the lawyer repays interest on a loan
taken out by the lawyer to fund the litigation.
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investors being publicly or privately solicited could gauge the likelihood of
success in the litigation in their decision to invest in the new issuance. Is
there any reason to allow such "venture capital" funding except when the
risky possibility is that of a lawsuit prevailing? Is "gambling" on an out-
come tolerable for gold mines and new car designs but intolerable for liti-
gation? Should it matter that the law is said to exist independent of the
case at hand, which merely "discovers" it?58 Isn't that also the case for the
gold mine?
C. Analysis and Critique
1. ALF-To-Consumers
Those who watch cable television are familiar with advertisements by
some of the three dozen firms that provide ALF to individual plaintiffs in
forty-five states.5 9 These funders perform almost no due diligence before
disbursing loan amounts: typically, they require little more than an affidavit
from a plaintiff's attorney certifying that he or she has accepted the client's
case and finds it viable is enough to trigger a non-recourse "investment" by
the funder. The perfunctory due diligence is understandable, given the
very low amount of the "investment" (on average $4000, and almost never
more than $20,000).60 The very high interest rates (60-80% per year) must
be understood in the context of this lack of substantive analysis: if only one
of every two funded suits resulted in recovery, the ALF firm would lose
money even at those lofty rates.6 1 In reality, funding firms must hope that
every funded case will result in at least a "nuisance" settlement, from which
the funding company would therefore take an enormous share. Nuisance
settlements are not atypical in automobile accident cases, which constitute
the bulk of ALF-To-Consumers.
Critics6 2 have decried the exorbitant interest that must be paid by
plaintiffs, who are often unsophisticated clients. It is certainly true that
those with little bargaining power often receive unfavorable terms. But it
is not clear that an acceptable alternative is to deny them this option, for
otherwise they might accept a low-ball settlement offer that is much worse
for them. Nor is it clear that "payday loans" (rarely available for those
58. Michael I. Krauss, Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES (William A. Darity, Jr., ed. ., Ed., 2d Ed. 2006).
59. For a representative ad by one of the larger firms in this area, Oasis Legal Finance, see the
following youtube: http://bit.ly/YVvBzh.
60. George S. Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry, 35 NEw ENG. L.Rev. 805,
824 (2001); Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues, Knowns and
Unknowns, RAND CORPORATION at 12 (2010).
61. Assume a $1000 advance. If case 1 resulted in no payment to the funder, and case 2 resulted
in a payment of $1800, the funder is still losing money.
62. See, e.g., Comments of the U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform to the Am. Bar Ass'n Work-
ing Group on Alternative Litig. Fin. (Feb. 15, 2011).
63. The more sophisticated clients are, typically, more credit-worthy, and therefore more likely
to be able to self-fund or to obtain conventional and lower-cost financing.
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injured in an accident) or loans from an American Indian reservation 6 4 are
more attractive: these loans are recourse loans that must be repaid in every
case, while ALF requires no payment from the plaintiff who, for whatever
reason, is unable to recover.
The real problem here is that the loan purveyor knows relatively little
about the real chances of success of the plaintiff's suit. The purveyor allays
this risk in two ways: by requiring a huge dollop of self-insurance (the aver-
age loan amount is very low, and the typical plaintiff must therefore bear
much of the financial burden of surviving until judgment or settlement) and
by charging an imposing interest rate. If purveyors had more competition,
these rates might go down and the amount loaned might go up.
And there is potential competition available: the plaintiff's lawyer,
who already has "skin in the game" (his contingent fee) and who may know
more about the chances of success of the lawsuit than anyone, including
perhaps the plaintiff. But the anti-maintenance Rule 1.8(e) prohibits the
plaintiff's attorney from competing with ALF purveyors. The perverse re-
sult is that those lending money are ill suited to do so. High "premiums"
and very incomplete "insurance" are predictable results.
Another frequently voiced critique of ALF-to-consumers, especially
by the United States Chamber of Commerce, is that it increases litigation
costs. This is allegedly so because, once they have received ALF, plaintiffs
are less likely to accept initial offers from defendants in "worthless" or low-
amount cases. Since the great majority of that initial offer will go to the
ALF purveyor, the plaintiff can, it is said, externalize the risk of litigation
by "rolling the dice" and going to trial, which is socially costly.6 5 There is
quite possibly truth to this assertion. On the other hand, the main brake on
the survival of low-value suits is the plaintiff's lawyer's decision that the
chances of earning substantial contingent fees are slim to none. In other
words, defendants and plaintiffs lawyers have a common interest in not
prolonging the agony of a worthless suit, even if the plaintiff himself is
indifferent to the situation because of ALF.
Perhaps the Chamber of Commerce feels that a suit with a 90% of no
recovery and a 10% chance of, say, a $500,000 recovery is a "worthless"
suit.6 6 A contingent fee lawyer, who diversifies his risk by taking on several
such suits, might pursue this one. And a plaintiff who has received $10,000
in ALF, and who therefore owes $18,000 from any settlement to the pur-
veyor, might refuse a $25,000 settlement offer. Whether this refusal is so-
cially wasteful or costly is a complex and difficult question, for the case is
64. See, e.g., Western Sky Loan Company terms of use, http://www.westernsky.com/TermsOfUse
.aspx available at http://www.westernsky.com/TermsOfUse.aspx (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
65. See, e.g., Nate Raymond, U.S. Chamber Calls For Regulation Of Litigation Funders,
REUTERS, (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/25/chamber-funders-idUSL1E8LPO
B020121025. IBM General Counsel reported that his company had faced numerous ALF lawsuits. He
claimed that the funders' involvement of litigation funders prolongs cases that otherwise would be on
their "death bed." "It adds to the court burden," he said. "We've seen it time and time again."
66. The chance of recovery might be slim because of the credibility of witnesses, or because of
statistical issues related to cause-in-fact.
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"worth" $50,000 given the figures used above. In any case any social cost
incurred by the litigation of such cases would presumably have to be bal-
anced against the social gain involved in cases where ALF enables a right-
eous plaintiff (that is, a plaintiff with a sure win case for, say, $50,000) to
turn down a $10,000 offer because he has the wherewithal to survive for a
few more months.
Clearly, making litigation less risky for plaintiffs will result, ceteris
paribus, in more litigation. Whether this is a socially bad or good thing
depends crucially on which litigation is pursued. For it is not a priori cer-
tain that only worthless litigation will be pursued. Thus, for example, the
recent $1.1 Billion settlement of Toyota's "unintended acceleration" law-
suit took place despite NHTSA determinations that no Toyotas or Lexuses
accelerated "all by themselves." In every case NHTSA determined that
user misuse (either in depressing the wrong pedal or in failing to attach
carpets correctly) was involved.6 7 Was this mammoth settlement caused by
ALF (assuming arguendo that some plaintiffs availed themselves of it)? Or
did bad publicity and the American Rule, which condemns Toyota to pay
enormous lawyers' fees even if it prevails at most trials, prompt the settle-
ment? If the Chamber wishes to attack an institution as giving rise to frivo-
lous suits, a more suitable target might be the American Rule. 8
Finally, criticism of ALF-to-consumers rightly invokes Model Rule 1.7.
A conflict of interest can arise if plaintiff's lawyer recommends an ALF
purveyor, advises client on the contract with the purveyor and advises the
purveyor during settlement negotiations. This is not an intrinsic criticism
of ALF-to-consumers, but a kind of "as applied" criticism.69 A lawyer who
prepares an ALF agreement for the purveyor is like a lawyer who prepares
a bank loan document that will enable his client to pay the lawyer's fees; he
must advise the client to get independent counsel, must obtain informed
consent if such counsel is declined, etc. 7 o
2. ALF-to-Plaintiffs'-Law-Firms
The current issue of the plaintiffs' bar's Trial magazine contains no
fewer than five advertisements for ALF-to-Plaintiffs'-Law-Firms, from
among the dozen or so firms that engage in this type of financing.71 This is
typically recourse funding (a true loan that must be repaid regardless of the
outcome of the case). It is sought by undercapitalized law firms that do not
have sufficient collateral for a bank loan secured by all the assets of the
67. NHTSA, Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems (2011),
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NHTSA-UA-report.pdf.
68. For a criticism of the American Rule, see Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 638 (1974).
69. Like an as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes, the success of this challenge to ALF
does not call the basic practice of ALF into question.
70. American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 Informational Report to the House
of Delegateson Alternate Litigation Financing to the ABA House of Delegates, available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20111212ethics_20_20_alf-white_
paperfinal hod informational-report.authcheckdam.pdf.
71. See Appendix 1 for an example of these ads.
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firm. The range of interest rates in ALF-to-Plaintiffs'-Law-Firms is un-
known, as these are private contracts, but one investigator has concluded
that rates are in the vicinity of 20 per cent per year for loans made post-suit
and pre-settlement, though much less for suits post-settlement but pre-re-
ceipt of funds. In any case rates are well above those available to corporate
law firms from commercial banks.7 2 Typically much more due diligence by
the funding firm takes place, since the funding per case greatly exceeds that
of ALF-to-consumers. This due diligence frequently requires the commu-
nication of confidential client information to the borrower (after informed
consent given by clients, of course). The clients' consent is likely to be
forthcoming because the granting of financing by a well capitalized funder
serves as a signal to the (typically corporate) defendant-opponent that the
plaintiff firm has the wherewithal to endure a long suit, and that third party
attorneys have vetted the claim in detail and found it valid. The funding
itself may contribute to a substantial settlement if the defense believes the
plaintiff has the ability to fully prosecute a case.
ALF-to-plaintiffs'-firms arguably gives the borrower an even greater
incentive to win a suit than does its contingent fee. Is this incentive too
strong? Is the financed lawyer more likely to succumb to pressure to bias
the process to repay his financiers and obtain future financing at lower
rates? An Ecuadorian ex-judge, who presided over the infamous Chevron
case, recently revealed that plaintiffs' lawyers had offered him a $500,000
bribe to secure an $18.2 billion judgment, and actually had actually drafted
the government's decision against the company. Were these lawyers fi-
nanced through ALF? If they were, that might be a reason for bar associa-
tions to monitor law firm capitalization closely to ensure that such Faustian
bargains are not reached.
So a risk of corruption there is, and Bar vigilance is needed. Bit it is
not clear that this risk of corruption is worse than, say, the risk that afflicts
defense lawyers' financed by insurance companies they are desirous of
pleasing in order to retain repeat business. 7" Whenever a non-client with
multiple repeat business promises money, whether that non-client be an
ALF purveyor or a liability insurer, lawyers' ethical mettle will be tested.
In every case the client must retain authority over decision-making75 and
the third party payers may not compromise the attorney's professional
competence. 76 If ALF is to be banned for this reason, should we ban in-
surer funding?
72. GARBER, supra note 60, at 13.
73. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL AcroN (1996), for an example where no large settlement
was forthcoming, in part because the plaintiff firm was undercapitalized and could not prosecute the
case competently.
74. Rule 1.8(f) prohibits lawyers from accepting compensation from a third party unless the cli-
ent gives informed consent. But the client clearly consents to ALF as he consents to insurer funding.
For an article demonstrating the difficult position of the lawyer in insurance-funded litigation, see
Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45
DUKE L.J. 255, 313 (1995).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.2(A) (2004).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 5.4(c) (2004).
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3. ALF-to-Corporate-Plaintiffs (High-Value Cases)
A half-dozen funding firms" provide capital directly to businesses or
to their outside counsel, to finance plaintiff-side high value (business-vs.-
business) claims. Here, unlike the other forms of ALF, it appears that fi-
nancing is provided in exchange for a percentage of eventual recovery.
Investments appear to vary from a few million dollars up to $20 Million,
with (as would be expected) very considerable due diligence by funding
firms. This funding is sought in part because of corporate regulations:
often, inside counsel does not want to commit corporate capital to a case if
such capital had not been identified for this purpose in the corporation's
past budgeting process. In addition, and importantly, inside counsel is typi-
cally very anxious to obtain the strong outside vetting that this type of ALF
provides, and that is additional to the evaluation of outside counsel, since
the latter (paid on an hourly basis perhaps) may be suspect. The very sub-
stantial investment by this type of ALF purveyor is a clear build-up in an
"arms race" with defendant, and is a sign of serious intent to litigate that is
likely designed to maximize the defendant's ultimate settlement offer.
One might wonder why, since there are no living expenses or "pain
and suffering" here, Corporate plaintiffs are not content to "finance" all
such cases via contingent fees? The answer, it seems, is that this type of
corporation typically does not want to hire contingent fee law firms, which
are typically the firms that sue them. They would prefer using their usual
firms, which use either fixed fee (Clearspire) or hourly billing. ALF is the
alternate financing in such cases, as contingent fees may not be available.7 9
There have been very few critiques leveled at this type of ALF. Inter-
est rates are low, there is no unequal bargaining power, and conflicts of
interest are exceedingly rare. It is important that corporate counsel under-
stands that the information communicated to obtain financing may result in
loss of privilege and work-product protection (in house counsel usually
provides informed consent to this effect), since the purveyors are not law-
yers. Case law is very skeletal on this count.80
V. CONCLUSION: Is REFORM NEEDED?
It is time to return to the questions raised earlier in this paper:
77. As of 2010, ARCA Capital, Burford Capital, Calunius Capital, IMF Australia, Juridica In-
vestments and Juris Capital invested in commercial claims. GARBER, supra note 60, at 15.
78. Id. at 13.
79. GARBER, supra note 60, at 38.
80. However, at least one state bar has opined on this issue: See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 769 (Nov. 4, 2003) ("The lawyer should advise the client that disclosures of confiden-
tial information to the financing institution might compromise the attorney-client privilege and might
therefore cause the information to be available to an adverse party in discovery) (citing see generally
PAUL R. RICE, ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 9 (2d ed. 1999)).
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A. Why Does a Partial Inalienability Rule, Instead of a Property Rule,
Protect our Entitlement to Causes of Action?
Some have argued for full purchase and sale of all dispute rights?s"
For them, clearly, commodifying causes of action and securitizing them as
desired present no problem.8 2 Many, however, will resist commodification
on the grounds that tort suits, at least consumer suits resulting from per-
sonal injuries causing non-economic harm, are too personal to be treated as
widgets. True, purely personal things can in a sense be borrowed against (I
can borrow money to be repaid from the revenue obtained through the use
of my arm if, say, I'm a baseball pitcher) but they may not be sold (the
ballplayer may not sell his arm). Should the ballplayer be able to sell the
lawsuit that results from the wrongful amputation of his arm?
Whatever the answer to this question, they are less apposite as regards
corporate litigation, and it is therefore not surprising to see securitization
of suits take place there.
B. Why Do We Give a Monopoly to Lawyers as Concerns Partial
Purchase of Tort Suit?
The malignant explanation for lawyers' monopoly on contingent fee
financing is that it is an economic rent acquired through Public Choice
abuse of the legal process." The benign explanation is that lawyers are
professionals and officers of the court, governed by a strict code of ethics to
which they swear a solemn oath, and who can therefore be trusted to pre-
serve their client's interests throughout the litigation.
Though of course many lawyers fall short of this ideal, I prefer the
benign explanation. My career as a legal ethics professor makes little sense
otherwise.
C. Given the Benign Explanation, Then, Why Not Just Expand the Role
of Lawyers to Allow Them to Provide ALF?
This, I think, is a reform whose time has quite possibly come. Lawyers
may already front court costs, other litigation costs (expert witnesses, etc.)
and their own time through the contingent fee. They have done due dili-
gence about a client's case in a way not feasible (in small cases) for funding
firms. They could therefore front much more than a $4000 non-recourse
advance for a case they truly believed in. Why not, then, relax 1.8(e) and
81. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 Yale L. J. 697 (2005).
82. For Professor Abramowicz's views on this issue, presented at the panel on Third Party Fi-
nancing of Litigation at the Fourth Annual Judicial Symposium on Civil Justice Issues, at Northwestern
Law School in December 2009, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRb6RoixbSU (last visited Aug.
23, 2013).
83. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Introduction to Lawyer Barons: What Their Contingency Fees Re-
ally Cost America, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 322 (Feb. 15, 2011), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1773796.
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allow lawyer to front living expenses and the like, or part thereof, as part of
their extra legal services84
Lawyers currently charge no interest to their clients for fronting court
costs and expert witness fees." Why would they charge more for fronting
living expenses?
Presumably, though, lawyers might themselves have to borrow to pro-
vide ALF to their clients. Ethics rules would allow them to charge back
any interest they pay for this (but not to mark up the interest, in my opin-
ion). They could borrow at rates (currently 20%) much below the exorbi-
tant rates charged by ALF firms to consumers. This would result in a much
lower effective interest rate for clients than they currently pay for ALF,
while procuring them much more in sustenance.
Market supply and demand might result in the loan becoming a re-
course conditional loan (with an increase in contingent percentage if there
is recovery, and the pass-through interest rate if there is no recovery) for
solvent plaintiffs, and a non-recourse advance (very high contingent fee if
there is recovery, nothing due otherwise) for indigent plaintiffs, much as
contingent fee lawyers are currently permitted to make court and expert
costs non-recourse loans. Might lawyers' contingent fees, under such ar-
rangements, appropriate the majority of a client's claim? That seems un-
likely, and if it happened, lawyers (unlike ALF purveyors) are sanctionable
for unreasonable fees under the Model Rules.
One beneficial side effect of allowing attorneys to provide ALF is that
a ploy of unethical plaintiffs' attorneys (alleging "newly discovered infor-
mation" to reduce the previously stated value of plaintiffs' case, to induce
plaintiffs to settle for a low amount, giving attorneys a contingent windfall
for almost no work and freeing them up to take the next windfall case)
would be foiled. Plaintiffs are much less likely to accept an unethical low-
ball offer communicated to their possibly conniving attorney if their essen-
tial life needs have been provided for through ALF. At the margin, unethi-
cal plaintiffs' lawyers will therefore be less likely to make such offers.
Might this change the structure of plaintiffs' law firms? It might. Bet-
ter-capitalized firms could obtain lower interest loans, which might begin to
resemble low-interest ALF-to-corporate-plaintiff loans more than than the
high-interest ALF-to-plaintiffs'-firms loans given to undercapitalized plain-
tiffs' firms today. Better-capitalized plaintiffs' firms would therefore offer
more favorable ALF financing to their clients. Plaintiffs' firms might start
to resemble defense firms in their size, structure and capitalization. It's not
clear that this is a problem: indeed, 1.8(e) may have led to inefficient un-
dercapitalization in plaintiffs' firms.
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 5.7 (2004).
85. Some states allow the charging of interest on the advancements, but it seems only to the
extent that the lawyer incurred those interest charge him or herself. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 345,
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion345.cfm; Kentucky
Bar Association Ethics Op. KBA E-216 (1979), available at http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics
opinions/kba-e-216.pdf.
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Might attorney-provided ALF be deemed maintenance or champerty?
It would be, if lawyers trolled for clients and offered to maintain them
pending judgment. But that is and would remain unethical and prohibited.
If lawyers did not troll for clients, they would no more be guilty of mainte-
nance and champerty than are current ALF firms. On the other hand, if
there is a real fear of champerty and maintenance, the state Bar might es-
tablish a clearing house to which plaintiffs' lawyers must refer cases (pre-
serving confidences and privilege) before obtaining permission to offer
ALF financing.
ALF has risks, but its time has come. The complex multidimensional
nature of tort litigation demands it. Attorneys can provide it ethically and
efficiently, I think. Maybe it's time to free the lawyers.
